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Human Zoning: The Constitutionality of Sex-Offender 




My definition of a free society is a society where it is safe to be 
unpopular. 
— Adlai Stevenson1  
National media coverage of recent, heinous sex crimes has brought 
sex-offenders’ punishments and restrictions to the forefront of most states’ 
legislative priorities.  Public outcry regarding these crimes is understand-
able.  In McKune v. Lile,2 Justice Kennedy stated, “[s]ex offenders are a 
serious threat in this Nation. . . .  [T]he victims of sexual assault are most 
often juveniles [and] . . . [w]hen convicted sex offenders reenter society, 
they are much more likely than any other type of offender to be rearrested 
for a new rape or sexual assault.”3  Studies show that pedophiles have a 
fifty-two percent recidivism4 rate and that rapists have a thirty-nine percent 
recidivism rate.5  These statistics demonstrate why politicians are seeking 
measures to protect the public from sex offenders.  The dangers posed by 
recidivist sex offenders must be addressed, but the haste with which legis-
latures are attempting to curb sex-offender recidivism has led to unconsti-
tutional policies.  
These high recidivism rates show that the threat of jail time alone is 
not sufficient to curb sex crimes.  With this in mind, legislators sought to 
find other ways that would protect potential victims.  Community notifica-
tion laws were the first policy to be implemented.  Community notification 
methods included press releases, flyers, phone calls, door-to-door contact, 
neighborhood meetings, and Internet sites, which informed citizens of the 
 * J.D. Candidate, Franklin Pierce Law Center, 2007. 
 1. Adlai Stevenson, Campaign Speech in Detroit, Michigan (Oct. 7, 1952), in MAJOR CAMPAIGN 
SPEECHES OF ADLAI E. STEVENSON 218 (1953).
 2. 536 U.S. 24 (2002). 
 3. Id. at 32-33. 
 4. Recidivist: “a repeat offender.”  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1297 (8th ed. 2004). 
 5. Jill S. Levenson & Leo P. Cotter, The Effect of Megan’s Law on Sex Offender Reintegration, 21 
J. CONTEMP. CRIM. JUST. 49, 50 (2005). 
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name, location, and/or other information of persons who had been con-
victed of sex crimes.6  
Legal challenges to these notification laws soon appeared in the courts.  
In Connecticut Department of Public Safety v. Doe,7 the U.S. Supreme 
Court upheld the constitutionality of sex-offender internet registries against 
a due process challenge, even though the registries applied to sex offenders 
regardless of their current threat to society.8  In Smith v. Doe,9 the U.S. 
Supreme Court upheld a sex-offender registration and notification statute 
against an ex post facto challenge even where the offender had been 
charged prior to the codification of the new requirements.10  Smith ce-
mented the legality of sex-offender registries, and soon thereafter all fifty 
states had some form of sex-offender registry in place. 
The public soon realized that these sex-offender registries did little to 
actually keep the sex offenders away from potential victims.  Sex offenders 
were still able to move in next door, roam public parks freely, and work 
wherever they were able to get hired.  Soon critics claimed that sex-
offender registries were nothing more than “feel good law(s).”11  In addi-
tion, sex-offender registries have been plagued with administrative prob-
lems that allow many sex offenders to slip through the system and others to 
be classified improperly. 
Since the U.S. Supreme Court seemingly settled the debate on the con-
stitutionality of sex-offender registration and notification requirements in 
2003,12 several states and local municipalities have begun to create laws 
that limit where sex offenders may reside.13  Courts generally ground justi-
  
 6. Id.  
 7. 538 U.S. 1 (2003). 
 8. Id. at 8.  
 9. 538 U.S. 84 (2003). 
 10. Id. at 85.  
 11. Heather McElvain, Web Map Shows Where Sex Offenders Can Live, IOWA CITY PRESS-CITIZEN, 
Oct. 5, 2005, at 14A (quoting Johnson County Attorney Patrick White).  
 12. Smith, 538 U.S. at 85.  
 13. Doe v. Miller, 405 F.3d 700, 714 n.4 (8th Cir. 2005) (“ALA. CODE § 15-20-26(a) (‘Unless oth-
erwise exempted by law, no adult criminal sex offender shall establish a residence or accept employ-
ment within 2,000 feet of the property on which any school or child care facility is located.’); ARK. 
CODE ANN. § 5-14-128(a) (‘It shall be unlawful for a sex offender who is required to register . . . and 
who has been assessed as a Level 3 or Level 4 offender to reside within two thousand feet (2000’) of 
the property on which any public or private elementary or secondary school or daycare facility is lo-
cated.’); CAL. PENAL CODE § 3003(g) ( ‘[A]n inmate who is released on parole for any violation of 
[sections prohibiting lewd or lascivious acts, or continued sexual abuse of a child] shall not be placed 
or reside . . . within one one-quarter mile of any public or private school.’); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 
947.1405(7)(a)(2) (‘Any inmate convicted of [certain sexual crimes against minors] and . . . subject to 
conditional release supervision . . . [is prohibited from] living within 1,000 feet of a school, day care 
center, park, playground, designated public school bus stop or other place where children regularly 
congregate.’); GA. CODE ANN. § 42-1-13(b) (‘No individual required to register . . . shall reside within 
1,000 feet of any child care facility, school, or area where minors congregate.’); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 
§ 5/11-9.3(b-5) (‘It is unlawful for a child sex offender to knowingly reside within 500 feet of a school 
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fications for these residency restrictions in the state’s interest in protecting 
the public’s and, specifically, children’s health and safety from the high 
recidivism rates of sex offenders.14  Most of these laws prohibit sex of-
fenders from living within a specified distance of schools, parks, day-care 
facilities, and other areas where children generally congregate.15  Some are 
specific to certain individuals,16 while others apply to all sex offenders, 
even if they were incarcerated prior to the law’s enactment.17  
Considering the staggering recidivism rates and the stomach turning 
nature of some of the crimes that constitute sex offenses, these restrictions 
seem justified to most and are difficult for legislators to oppose.  Unfortu-
nately, these laws have unreasonable practical effects and do little to help 
those in need of protection.  
These laws force sex offenders to live in rural areas, far from the sup-
port networks required for their reintegration into society.  Some restric-
  
building . . . .’); KY. REV.STAT. ANN. § 17.495 (‘No registrant . . . who is placed on probation, parole, 
or any form of supervised release, shall reside within one thousand (1,000) feet of a high school, mid-
dle school, elementary school, preschool, or licensed day care facility.’); LA. REV.STAT. § 
14:91.1(A)(2) (‘Unlawful presence of a sexually violent predator is . . . the physical residing of a sexu-
ally violent predator within one thousand feet of any public or private, elementary or secondary school, 
a day care facility, playground, public or private youth center, public swimming pool, or free standing 
video arcade facility.’); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2950.031(A) (‘No person who has been convicted of . 
. . either a sexually oriented offense that is not a registration-exempt sexually oriented offense or a 
child-victim oriented offense shall establish a residence or occupy residential premises within one 
thousand feet of any school premises.’); OKLA. STAT. tit. 57, § 590 (‘It is unlawful for any person 
registered pursuant to the Oklahoma Sex Offenders Registration Act to reside within a two thousand-
foot radius of any public or private school site or educational institution.’); OR. REV. STAT. § 
144.642(1)(a) (Rules for post-prison supervision or parole ‘shall include . . . a general prohibition 
against allowing a sex offender to reside near locations where children are the primary occupants or 
users.’); TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-39- 211(a) (‘No sexual offender, . . . or violent sexual offender, . . . 
shall knowingly reside or work within one thousand feet (1,000’) of the property on which any public 
school, private or parochial school, licensed day care center, or any other child care facility is lo-
cated.’).”); see also IND. CODE ANN. § 11-13-3-4(g)(2) (West 2006) (“As a condition of parole, the 
parole board shall . . . prohibit the offender from residing within on thousand (1,000) feet of school 
property”); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 28.735 (West 2006) (“an individual required to be registered . . 
. shall not reside within a [1,000 feet or less from school property]”); MO. ANN. STAT. § 566.147 (West 
2006) (“Any person who has . . . been convicted of . . . [certain sexual crimes against minors] shall not 
establish residency within one thousand feet of any public school, . . . any private school, . . . or child 
care facility”); TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 42.12(13B) (Vernon 2006) (“If a judge grants com-
munity supervision to a defendant . . . and the judge determines that a child . . . was the victim of the 
offense, the judge shall . . . [require] . . . that the defendant . . . not . . . go in, on or within 1,000 feet of 
a premises where children commonly gather.”).  
 14. See generally Miller, 405 F.3d at 704-05 (2005) (“[W]e conclude that the Constitution of the 
United States does not prevent the State of Iowa from regulating the residency of sex offenders in this 
manner in order to protect the health and safety of the citizens.”). 
 15. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-14-128(a) (West 2006) (specifying 2000 feet); 720 ILL. COMP. ANN. § 
5/11-9.3(b-5) (West 2006) (specifying 500 feet).  
 16. Doe v. City of Lafayette, 377 F.3d 757, 774 (7th Cir. 2004) (upholding city imposed ban against 
Doe from entering public parks).  
 17. IOWA CODE § 692A.2A (2005) (“‘person’ means a person who has committed a criminal offense 
against a minor”). 
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tions apply to sex offenders who have been released from prison for dec-
ades and offenders whose crimes did not involve children.  Others allow 
officials to evict families who have lived in their homes for years.  Several 
jurists have likened the restrictions to banishment.18  Others have stated 
that the new laws inch toward “human zoning regulations.”19  A Seventh 
Circuit decision in 2004 which upheld a sex-offender restriction has been 
questioned by legal scholars as punishment for thoughts.20  The sex-
offender residency restriction laws create a one-upmanship attitude among 
legislators who are forced to keep their districts from becoming sex-
offender havens for those who have effectively been forced out of other 
areas.21  
In spite of these problems, few residency restrictions have been ad-
dressed in court.  Currently, only the Seventh and Eighth Circuits have 
heard cases involving sex-offender residency restrictions.  The Seventh 
Circuit originally found the City of Lafayette’s restriction unconstitutional 
on a number of grounds, but that decision was overturned when re-heard 
en banc.22  The Eighth Circuit’s two-to-one split decision overturned the 
district court’s finding of five separate constitutional violations.23  
While the Seventh and Eighth Circuits left sex-offender restriction leg-
islation unchecked, the U.S. Supreme Court is unlikely to be able to do so.  
Sex-offender registration and notification laws were justified by the fact 
that the information was generally public already.  With sex-offender resi-
dency restrictions, the state will have to overcome a difficult burden of 
proving the law is not an ex post facto24 punishment that equates to modern 
banishment when applied to post-conviction sex offenders.  Furthermore, 
questions exist as to whether the restrictions impinge upon substantive due 
process rights.  Part II of this note will describe current sex-offender re-
  
 18. Miller, 405 F.3d at 724 (Melloy, J., dissenting) (“it sufficiently resembles banishment”); State v. 
Seering, 701 N.W.2d 655, 672 (Iowa 2005) (Wiggins, J., dissenting) (“I would hold [Iowa’s sex of-
fender residency restriction] effectively banishes an offender from a community”); see also Doe, 377 
F.3d at 774 (Williams, J., dissenting) (“The City’s action is reminiscent of a partial banishment.”).  
 19. Michael J. Duster, Out of Sight, Out of Mind: State Attempts to Banish Sex Offenders, 53 DRAKE 
L. REV. 711, 714 (2005).  
 20. Doe, 377 F.3d at 774; see generally Clay Calvert, Freedom of Thought, Offensive Fantasies and 
the Fundamental Human Right to Hold Deviant Ideas: Why the Seventh Circuit Got It Wrong in Doe v. 
City of Lafayette, Indiana, 3 PIERCE L. REV. 125 (2005); Jennifer B. Siverts, Comment, Punishing 
Thoughts Too Close to Reality: A New Solution to Protect Children from Pedophiles, 27 T. JEFFERSON 
L. REV. 393 (2005). 
 21. Jim Saunders, Lawmakers Want State to Create Uniformity in Sex Predator Rules, DAYTONA 
NEWS, Oct. 20, 2005, § C (quoting Palm Coast Councilman Jon Netts); Robert F. Worth, Exiling Sex 
Offenders from Town; Questions About Legality and Effectiveness, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 3, 2005, at B1 
(quoting Joseph Scarpelli, Mayor of Brick, New Jersey).   
 22. Doe v. City of Lafayette, 334 F.3d 606, 613 (7th Cir. 2003), rev’d en banc, 377 F.3d 757 (7th 
Cir. 2004).  
 23. Doe v. Miller, 298 F.Supp.2d 844, 880 (S.D. Iowa 2004), rev’d, 405 F.3d 700 (8th Cir. 2005). 
 24. Ex post facto: “After the fact; retroactively.”  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 620 (8th ed. 2004). 
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strictions in place across the country.  Part III will provide a constitutional 
analysis of these sex-offender restrictions.  Based on this analysis, Part IV 
will conclude by advocating against sex-offender restrictions and offering 
alternatives.  
II. SEX-OFFENDER RESTRICTIONS 
Many states and municipalities have begun creating sex-offender re-
strictions.  Often, a state or municipality copies, combines, or adds on to a 
neighboring state’s or municipality’s restrictions.  Residency restrictions 
may seem reasonable when they are looked at on a case-by-case basis.  
However, as more and more restrictions are combined, they will effectively 
banish sex offenders out of the country.  
Drastic residency restrictions are already in force or being considered 
by legislatures across the country.  Georgia, a state with only 159 counties, 
implemented a 158-county banishment system for persistent troublemakers 
and those whom other punishments do not deter.25  For a judge to banish 
someone, the State requires: (1) a logical relation to the rehabilitative proc-
ess; and (2) that the length of banishment bear a reasonable relation to the 
rehabilitation.26  Criminal psychologists believe that minimizing a sex-
offender’s exposure to possible triggers is part of a healthy rehabilitative 
process.27  A judge can therefore banish a sex-offender to the one unpopu-
lated county in Georgia as part of the rehabilitative process to keep a sex-
offender away from potential triggers.  
Cape Coral, Florida considers its beaches and coastline to be public 
parks.  Offenders in Cape Coral are, therefore, being restricted from living 
near or visiting the beaches, and a local councilman has stated that he 
would like to extend the restricted zone to one mile.28  In Hillsborough 
County, Florida, local officials voted to ban sex offenders from public hur-
ricane shelters.29  In Saratoga, New York, legislation is being considered 
that would preclude sex offenders from patronizing hotels that fall within 
  
 25. Jason S. Alloy, 158-County Banishment in Georgia: Constitutional Implications Under the State 
Constitution and the Federal Right to Travel, 36 GA. L. REV. 1083, 1084-85 (2002). 
 26. Id. at 1093. 
 27. See Kim English, The Containment Approach to Managing Sex Offenders, 34 SETON HALL L. 
REV. 1255, 1260-61 (2004). 
 28. See Don Ruane, Cape Plan May Widen Predator-Free Zones, NEWS-PRESS, Oct. 1, 2005, at 1A  
(discussing Cape Coral Councilman Tim Day’s proposal to create a one mile protection zone). 
 29. Worth, supra note 21, at B1. 
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the restricted zone.30  In Ocean City, Maryland, a legislator has attempted 
to ban all sex offenders from the City.31  
In Florida, Georgia, and Texas, the restrictions are, at best, vague.  All 
three states restrict sex offenders from living within so many feet of an 
area where children generally congregate.32  These restrictions could be 
interpreted to ban sex offenders from restaurants, museums, convention 
centers, and all other public venues.   
Other types of sex offender restrictions are being considered across the 
country.  Legislation giving convicted sex offenders 180 days to obtain a 
new driver’s license bearing the words “Sex Offender” was recently intro-
duced in the Oklahoma Senate.33  Failure to comply with this requirement 
would result in the revocation of the person’s driver’s license for a year 
and a maximum fine of $200.34
As these individual laws are deemed constitutional, legislatures have 
begun combining and broadening the laws creating a super restriction.  
Imagine a restriction preventing offenders from living in all but one county 
in the state and within a mile of schools, childcare facilities, parks (includ-
ing beaches), and other areas where children congregate.  This broad range 
of restrictions might include hotels, restaurants, sports arenas, concerts, 
malls, homeless shelters, and disaster shelters.  Such super restrictions 
would cripple the ability of the broad class of persons labeled sex offenders 
to find housing, make a living, and attend rehabilitation classes and ther-
apy.35  
  
 30. Jim Kinney, Supervisors: Saratoga Offender Rules Could Burden Clerks, SARATOGIAN, Oct. 2, 
2005 (reporting on sex offenders living in a motel and planned city laws that would ban such resi-
dency). 
 31. Michael Miller, Ocean City Bans Sex Offenders From Living Near Beach, PRESS ATLANTIC 
CITY, Oct. 5, 2005, § Region (reporting on city council’s initial plan that would have banned all those 
required to register under Megan’s Law from the city). 
 32. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 947.1405(7)(a)(2) (West 2006) (“or other place where children regularly 
congregate”); GA.CODE ANN. § 42-1-13(b) (West 2006) (“or area where minors congregate”); TEX. 
CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 42.12(13B) (Vernon 2006) (“within 1,000 feet of a premises where chil-
dren commonly gather”). 
 33. S.B. 35, 51st Leg., 1st Sess. (Okla. 2007).  
 34. Id. 
 35. See generally GA. CODE ANN. § 16-6 (2005) (Georgia’s list of included sex offenses: rape; 
sodomy; statutory rape; child molestation; enticing a child for indecent purposes; sexual assault against 
persons in custody; bestiality; necrophilia; public indecency; prostitution; keeping a place of prostitu-
tion; pimping; pandering; pandering by compulsion; solicitation of sodomy; masturbation for hire; 
giving massages in place used for lewdness; fornication; adultery; bigamy; marrying a bigamist; incest; 
sexual battery; aggravated sexual battery; publication of the name or identity of female raped; and 
distributing obscene materials).  
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III. CONSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS OF SEX-OFFENDER RESTRICTIONS 
A.  Ex Post Facto Clause 
1.  Summary of the Legal Standard 
The Ex Post Facto Clause forbids the government from imposing a 
new, punitive measure on a crime that has already been completed.36  The 
four categories of ex post facto laws are:  
1st.  Every law that makes an action, done before the passing of 
the law, and which was innocent when done, criminal; and pun-
ishes such action.  2nd.  Every law that aggravates a crime, or 
makes it greater than it was, when committed.  3rd.  Every law that 
changes the punishment, and inflicts a greater punishment, than the 
law annexed to the crime, when committed.  4th.  Every law that 
alters the legal rules of evidence, and receives less, or different, 
testimony, than the law required at the time of the commission of 
the offence, in order to convict the offender.37   
Challenges to residency restrictions would fall under the third category.  
Smith outlined the framework that must be applied to determine 
whether a sex-offender residency restriction violates the Ex Post Facto 
Clause by imposing a retroactive punishment.38  The first question is what 
was the intent of the legislature in implementing this law?  If the legisla-
ture intended criminal punishment, then the inquiry ends, the intent of the 
legislature is punitive, and the law will be deemed unconstitutional.39  If, 
on the other hand, the legislature claims that the law is civil and nonpuni-
tive, then the law must be analyzed to determine whether the law is none-
theless “‘so punitive either in purpose or effect as to negate’ the state’s 
nonpunitive intent.”40
The five relevant factors in determining if the law is punitive are 
whether the law: (1) “imposes an affirmative disability or restraint”; (2) 
“has been regarded in our history and traditions as a punishment”; (3) “has 
a rational connection to a nonpunitive purpose”; (4) “is excessive with 
respect to this purpose”; and (5) “promotes the traditional aims of punish-
ment.”41  “The punitive effects of the law must be so severe as to constitute 
  
 36. Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 92 (2003).  
 37. Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 390 (1796); see, e.g., Stogner v. California, 539 U.S. 607 
(2003); Carmell v. Texas, 529 U.S. 513, 539 (2000); Siverts, supra note 20, at 404.  
 38. Doe v. Miller, 405 F.3d 700, 718 (8th Cir. 2005). 
 39. Id. 
 40. Id. (quoting Smith, 538 U.S. at 92) 
 41. Smith, 538 U.S. at 97.  
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the ‘clearest proof’ that a statute intended by the legislature to be nonpuni-
tive and regulatory should nonetheless be deemed to impose ex post facto 
punishment.”42
The most debated of these factors is whether sex-offender residency 
restrictions amount to banishment or its modern equivalent.  Further, while 
most courts accept the stated intent of the legislators, recent statements 
made by legislators around the country may warrant a closer scrutiny. 
2.  What Is the Legislator’s Intent in Passing Such Requirements?  
The burden of proving the intent of the legislature in enacting a statute 
is very low.  When a legislative statement is included, it will define the 
intent of the legislature.  At other times, the placement of the new statute, 
in the criminal or public safety chapters of the state’s code for example, 
can be a sign of the legislative intent.  The legislative history and any tran-
script of discussion on the matter can also be used to define the intent of 
the statute.  Finally, public statements can be persuasive in determining 
legislative intent.  
While some legislators have claimed that their intent was to protect the 
health and safety of their constituents, others have made it quite clear that 
they had a punitive goal in mind.  New York Assemblyman Harvey 
Weisenberg stated during a discussion on the New York sex offender law 
that “the result of this [legislation] . . . is the fact that a sex offender who is 
going to come out after serving his time might rethink as to where he is 
going to relocate, and I think that one of the results of this legislation might 
be that this guy is going to go out of town, out of state, and that’s very 
good for us.”43  Tennessee State Senator Rusty Crowe stated that “we’ll 
see sex offenders leaving Tennessee and you won’t see them coming in.”44  
Representative Susan Goldstein, a Florida lawmaker, stated that the goal of 
sex-offender residency restriction laws is “to get these people out of our 
neighborhoods and hopefully out of our state.”45
The courts have upheld sex-offender residency restrictions by stating 
that the restrictions were civil in nature because the legislatures had created 
them to protect the health and safety of its citizens.46  These types of com-
ments from legislators will make it easier to prove that the intentions stated 
  
 42. Miller, 405 F.3d at 719. 
 43. Doron Teichman, The Market for Criminal Justice: Federalism, Crime Control, And Jurisdic-
tional Competition, 103 MICH. L. REV. 1831, 1855 (2005) (citing Doe v. Pataki, 940 F.Supp. 603, 621-
22 (S.D.N.Y. 1996)). 
 44. Id. (citing Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 3, Cutshall v. Sundquist, 529 U.S. 1054 (2000) (No. 
99-1123)). 
 45. Jason Garcia, State May Crack Down on Predators, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Sept. 14, 2005, at A1.  
 46. E.g., Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 85 (2003). 
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in the preambles of new statutes and their placement in the code are a 
sham, and that the true intentions are punitive. 
3.  Do Residency Restrictions Punish the Offender in a Manner That 
Equates to Banishment?  
Ha, banishment!  Be merciful, say death for exile hath more terror 
in his look, much more than death: do not say banishment. 
— William Shakespeare47  
Banishment, exile, or transporting, i.e., the sending of criminals to dis-
tant colonies, has historically been punitive in nature.48  Banishment is 
listed as a punishment in the oldest recorded system of law, The Code of 
Hammurabi, which was written around 1700 B.C.49  
Developed societies have tended to eliminate banishment as a form of 
punishment.50  Learned Hand stated “[banishment] is to him exile, a dread-
ful punishment, abandoned by the common consent of all civilized peo-
ples.”51  Federal law is settled that banishment as a condition of probation 
is unconstitutional.52  
Some scholars have speculated that in primitive societies, banishment 
was tantamount to death because banishment was widely publicized.53  
Banishment led to a defamation of the person’s character that made it next 
to impossible for the person to ever return to his home and very difficult to 
move anywhere else.  While current restrictions do not directly ostracize a 
person, sex-offender registries in conjunction with sex-offender restrictions 
have the same effect.  
The effects of sex-offender registries in conjunction with sex-offender 
residency restrictions are that sex offenders are being denied housing even 
outside the residency restriction zones.  For example, one of the plaintiff 
sex offenders in Doe v. Miller challenging the Iowa statute, stated that once 
he found an apartment outside the sex-offender restriction zones, he was 
forced to move out when his landlord discovered that he was a sex of-
fender.54  Two other plaintiffs stated that their applications for housing in a 
compliant area were denied because of their criminal record.55  
  
 47. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, ROMEO AND JULIET act 3, sc. 2.  
 48. Poodry v. Tonawanda Band of Seneca Indians, 85 F.3d 874, 889 (2d Cir. 1996).  
 49. United States v. Abushaar, 761 F.2d 954, 959 (3d Cir. 1985).  
 50. Id. 
 51. United States ex rel. Klonis v. Davis, 13 F.2d 630, 630 (2d Cir. 1926). 
 52. Klapprott v. United States, 335 U.S. 601, 616-17 (1949) (Rutledge, J., concurring). 
 53. H. BARNES & N. TEETERS, NEW HORIZONS IN CRIMINOLOGY 294 (3d ed. 1959). 
 54. Doe v. Miller, 405 F.3d 700, 706 (8th Cir. 2005).  
 55. Id. at 706-07.  
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Judge Melloy’s dissent in Miller stated that residency restrictions cre-
ated a permanent stigma as well as cast the person out of the community.56  
Melloy referenced Smith and described banishment as a punishment in 
which individuals “could neither return to their original community nor, 
reputation tarnished, be admitted easily into a new one.”57
The requirements placed on sex offenders now amount to the equiva-
lent of banishment.  The Smith Court held that the registration requirement 
was not a punishment.58  In the Court’s analysis of whether the law was 
punitive, Justice Kennedy stated:  
The [sex-offender registration] Act does not restrain activities sex 
offenders may pursue but leaves them free to change jobs or resi-
dences.  The Act imposes no physical restraint, and so does not re-
semble the punishment of imprisonment, which is the paradigmatic 
affirmative disability or restraint. . . .  By contrast, offenders sub-
ject to the Alaska statute are free to move where they wish and to 
live and work as other citizens, with no supervision.59  
The Smith decision was split six-to-three, yet while the majority found the 
registration requirement not to be punitive, it emphasized more than once 
that restrictions on a person’s ability to choose where she lives would be 
more like traditional banishment.  
Residency restrictions constitute de facto banishment.  A proposed 
sex-offender residency restriction in Phillipsburg, Pennsylvania would 
make ninety-eight percent of the town off limits to those on the sex-
offender registry.60  A Florida councilman said he is not worried about the 
areas not covered by the restriction zones because they are in areas of town 
where the “land is too expensive to buy.”61  In Des Moines and Iowa City, 
Iowa, the 2,000 foot restriction zones cover “virtually the entire city area.  
The few areas not restricted, include only industrial areas or some of the 
city’s newest and most expensive neighborhoods.”62  
  
 56. Id. at 724 (Melloy, J., concurring and dissenting). 
 57. Id.  
 58. Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 100-01 (2003).  
 59. Id. (emphasis added).   
 60. Harley Payette, P’burg May Restrict Sex Offenders’ Housing, MORNING CALL (Allentown, Pa.), 
Oct. 12, 2005, at B6. 
 61. Ruane, supra note 28, at 1A (discussing Cape Coral Councilman Tim Day’s proposal to create a 
one mile protection zone). 
 62. Doe v. Miller, 405 F.3d 700, 724 (8th Cir. 2005) (“The district court made the following factual 
findings on the availability of housing: Sex offenders are completely banned from living in a number of 
Iowa’s small towns and cities.  In the state’s major communities, offenders are relegated to living in 
industrial areas, in some of the cities’ most expensive developments, or on the very outskirts of town 
where available housing is limited.  Although some areas are completely unrestricted, these are either 
very small towns without any services, or farmland. . . .  In larger cities such as Des Moines and Iowa 
City, the maps show that the two thousand foot circles cover virtually the entire city area.  The few 
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At best, these types of restrictions effectively prevent sex offenders 
from living in heavily populated areas.  If unrestricted zones exist within 
the city, they are most likely in industrial zones or areas where the proper-
ties are too costly for recently released criminals.  Even if the offender is 
able to find a place that he or she can afford, public notification statutes 
stigmatize the offenders and make it difficult for the offender to pass the 
housing application process.  In conjunction with required registration, 
sex-offender residency restrictions create a de facto banishment. 
B.  Substantive Due Process 
Due process has not been reduced to any formula; its content can-
not be determined by reference to any code.  The best that can be 
said is that through the course of this Court’s decisions it has rep-
resented the balance which our Nation, built upon postulates of re-
spect for the liberty of the individual, has struck between that lib-
erty and the demands of organized society. 
— Justice Harlan63
1.  Summary of the Legal Standard 
The Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution mandates that no 
state shall “deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due 
process of law.”64  In addition to the “guarantee of fair procedure,” the Due 
Process Clause also includes a substantive component, “which forbids the 
government to infringe certain ‘fundamental’ liberty interests at all, no 
matter what process is provided, unless the infringement is narrowly tai-
lored to serve a compelling state interest.”65  
The U.S. Supreme Court has found substantive due process rights to 
include the right to marry,66 to have children,67 to direct the education and 
  
areas in Des Moines, for instance, which are not restricted, include only industrial areas or some of the 
city’s newest and most expensive neighborhoods.  In smaller towns that have a school or childcare 
facility, the entire town is often engulfed by the excluded area.  In Johnson County alone, the towns of 
Lone Tree, North Liberty, Oxford, Shueyville, Solon, Swisher, and Tiffin are wholly restricted to sex 
offenders under § 692A.2A.  Unincorporated areas and towns too small to have a school or childcare 
facility remain available, as does the country, but available housing in those areas is not necessarily 
readily available.”). 
 63. Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 542 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting).  
 64. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.  
 65. Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 301-02 (1993) (citing Collins v. City of Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 
115, 125 (1992)); Doe v. Miller, 298 F. Supp.2d 844, 871 (S.D. Iowa 2004).  
 66. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).  
 67. Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535 (1942). 
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upbringing of one’s children,68 to marital privacy,69 to use contraception,70 
to bodily integrity,71 to abortion,72 and to privacy and choice in one’s per-
sonal and sexual relationships.73  The U.S. Supreme Court has cautioned 
against expanding the concept of substantive due process.74  
The substantive due process analysis has two primary requirements.75  
First, “the Due Process Clause specially protects those fundamental rights 
and liberties which are, objectively, deeply rooted in this Nation’s history 
and tradition, and implicit in the concept of ordered liberty, such that nei-
ther liberty nor justice would exist if they were sacrificed.”76  Second, sub-
stantive due process also requires a “careful description of the asserted 
fundamental liberty interest.”77  As the U.S. Supreme Court has stated, 
“[o]ur Nation’s history, legal traditions, and practices thus provide the cru-
cial ‘guideposts for responsible decision making’ that direct and restrain 
our exposition of the Due Process Clause.”78
A careful description of the asserted right must first be considered to 
determine if that right invokes the protections of the substantive Due Proc-
ess Clause.79  To be afforded protection, the right must be “fundamental” 
in that it is “objectively, deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradi-
tion, and implicit in the concept of ordered liberty, such that neither liberty 
nor justice would exist if [it] were sacrificed.”80  If the right is “fundamen-
tal,” then the law burdening that right must pass strict scrutiny analysis.81  
Specifically, the state must prove that the law is “narrowly tailored to serve 
a compelling state interest.”82  
The few constitutional challenges to sex-offender restrictions have in-
volved the right to personal choice in family relationships and the right to 
travel.83  
  
 68. Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923).  
 69. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).  
 70. Id. 
 71. Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952).  
 72. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).  
 73. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).  
 74. Collins v. City of Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 125 (1992).  
 75. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720 (1997). 
 76. Id. at 720-21 (quoting Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977) (plurality opin-
ion) and Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325, 326 (1937) (quotations omitted)). 
 77. Id. at 721. 
 78. Id. (quoting Collins, 503 U.S. at 125 (citation omitted)). 
 79. Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 302 (1993).  
 80. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 720-21. 
 81. See id. at 721.  
 82. Id. (quoting Reno, 507 U.S. at 302). 
 83. See, e.g., Doe v. Miller, 405 F.3d 700 (8th Cir. 2005).  
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2.  What is the Right Being Asserted and Does It Substantially Burden 
the Familial Relationship?  
The due process issue is whether sex-offender restrictions involve the 
fundamental right regarding familial relationship.  The U.S. Supreme Court 
has recognized that freedom of personal choice in matters of marriage and 
family life is one of the liberties protected by the Due Process Clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment.84  
Without doubt, [liberty] denotes not merely freedom from bodily 
restraint but also the right of the individual to contract, to engage 
in any of the common occupations of life, to acquire useful knowl-
edge, to marry, establish a home and bring up children, to worship 
God according to the dictates of his own conscience, and generally 
to enjoy those privileges long recognized at common law as essen-
tial to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men.85  
If the right being asserted is only that of “freedom of choice in where an 
offender lives and under what conditions,” then the statute must only have 
a rational relation to a non-punitive state purpose.86  If, on the other hand, 
the statute does impinge upon the familial relationship, then the statute 
must pass strict scrutiny.  
The U.S. Supreme Court has stated that an alleged infringement on a 
familial right is unconstitutional, as a due process violation, only when an 
infringement has a direct and substantial impact on the familial relation-
ship.87  The case that is most on point is Moore v. City of East Cleveland.88  
In Moore, the City of East Cleveland had created a zoning restriction that 
made it criminal for a grandmother and her grandchildren to live to-
gether.89  The Court found that the zoning ordinance had both a direct and 
substantial impact on the familial relationship.90  The zoning ordinance 
directly affected the family because it defined “family” in a manner that 
did not include the Moores’ family situation.91  It had a substantial impact 
because it made it criminal for the family to live together in their current 
home.92
  
 84. Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632, 639-40 (1974).  
 85. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923) (emphasis added).  
 86. State v. Seering, 701 N.W.2d 655, 664 (Iowa 2005). 
 87. See, e.g., Lyng v. Castillo, 477 U.S. 635, 638 (1986); Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 
494, 499 (1977); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 213-14 (1972). 
 88. 431 U.S. at 494.  
 89. Id.  
 90. Id. at 500.  
 91. Id. 
 92. Id. 
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In spite of the U.S. Supreme Court’s holding in Moore, the Eighth Cir-
cuit concluded that a sex-offender residency restriction only has an inci-
dental effect on the family relationship.93  The Court distinguished Moore, 
pointing out that the residency restriction statute “does not operate directly 
on the family relationship.  Although the law restricts where a residence 
may be located, nothing in the statute limits who may live with the [sex 
offenders] in their residences.”94  Furthermore, it commented that the law 
“affects or encourages decisions on family matters but does not force such 
decisions.”95  By this rationale, the statute would have to explicitly state 
that sex offenders’ families could not live within the restricted zone in or-
der to directly affect the family relationship.  The standard established by 
the U.S. Supreme Court is whether a statute “unreasonably interferes” with 
the right to personal choice regarding the family, not whether it completely 
restricts it.96
If the statute precludes one member of the family from living in a cer-
tain location, then the statute has the exact effect as that in Moore: it forces 
the entire family either to choose to live separately or to move to a locale 
that does not have such a restriction on housing.  It is an unavoidable con-
sequence of the statute for families to have to move out of their current 
homes, cities, and possibly even the entire state.  Therefore, the effect of 
the regulation is not incidental.97
As discussed earlier, residency restrictions make it very difficult for of-
fenders to find acceptable housing in a municipality.  Any acceptable hous-
ing within a municipality that the offender finds is, by definition, a large 
distance from schools and parks that an offender’s children might attend.  
Moreover, as many of the cases have shown, the sex-offender restriction 
zones force sex offenders to leave populated areas altogether.  
  
 93. See Doe v. Miller, 405 F.3d 700, 710 (8th Cir. 2005). 
 94. Id.  
 95. Id. (quoting Gorrie v. Bowen, 809 F.2d 508, 523 (8th Cir. 1987)). 
 96. See Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 617-18 (1984) (“undue intrusion”); Pierce v. Soc’y 
of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925) (“unreasonably interferes”); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 
399 (1923) (“unreasonably infringes”).  
 97. See generally H.P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v. Du Mond, 336 U.S. 525 (1949) (facially neutral law 
that was found to have a discriminatory effect). 
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IV. CONCLUSION 
You have that sex offender [who thinks] “What do I have to lose? 
I’ve lost my wife, I’ve lost my job and now I’ve lost my place to 
live.  I might as well be that bad person that they think I am.” 
— Sergeant Keith Hubbard98
Courts have long recognized that people cannot be punished based on 
their status in society.99  “No matter how repulsed society is concerning 
sex offenders, we cannot place offenders in a unique, separate class bereft 
of constitutional rights.”100  Proponents of special regulation for sex of-
fenders often cite the high recidivism rates for those accused of sex of-
fenses to justify the harsh punishment.  What they fail to mention is that 
the recidivism rate for sex offenders is lower than that of drunk drivers, 
drug offenders, and domestic violence offenders.101  The nature of the 
crimes that sex offenders commit has created an animus from society that 
is apparent in the laws created to punish them.  Sex offenders, on average, 
serve sentences that are three times longer than the average for all fel-
ons.102
Even against a background of public outcry, the courts must analyze 
sex-offender residency restrictions to determine their constitutionality.  
Sex-offender residency restrictions that apply to post-conviction offenders 
are unconstitutional as violations of the Ex Post Facto and substantive Due 
Process Clauses of the U.S. Constitution.  Legislators have injected their 
animus against sex offenders into these restrictions and have created laws 
that are tantamount to de facto banishment.  The restrictions directly and 
substantially affect the ability of sex offenders to make decisions regarding 
their families.  For these reasons, the courts should strike down sex-
offender residency restrictions that impinge on the constitutionally pro-
tected rights of all citizens, including sex offenders. 
  
 98. Garcia, supra note 45, at B3 (quoting Sergeant Keith Hubbard, a ten-year veteran of the Orange 
County Sheriff’s Office’s sex offender surveillance unit). 
 99. See Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 666-67 (1962).  
 100. Amy L. Van Duyn, The Scarlet Letter Branding: A Constitutional Analysis of Community  
Notification Provisions in Sex Offender Statutes, 47 DRAKE L. REV. 635, 659 (1999). 
 101. Worth, supra note 21, at B1.   
 102. WASH. SENTENCING GUIDELINES COMM’N, SEX OFFENDER SENTENCING 3 (2004).    
 
